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We introduce foreign private ﬁrms into the model of Pal (1998) and investigate the
impact of the introduction of foreign private ﬁrms on the endogenous timing in a
mixed oligopoly in the linear demand case. We ﬁnd that the public ﬁrm chooses to
be a follower of all domestic private ﬁrms and that the public ﬁrm chooses not to
be a leader of all foreign private ﬁrms, which is in contrast to Matsumura (2003).
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1 Introduction
Studies of mixed markets, in which welfare-maximizing public ﬁrms
compete against proﬁt-maximizing private ﬁrms, have become increas-
ingly popular in recent years.
1 The mixed oligopoly consists of public
ﬁrms and domestic private ﬁrms in most of the literature on mixed oli-
gopoly, but foreign private ﬁrms are also included in a few studies. For
example, Corneo and Jeanne (1994) considered mixed oligopolies in an
international setting where public ﬁrms compete with domestic private
1 See De Fraja and Delbono (1990), and Nett (1993) for general reviews of the
mixed oligopoly models. For recent literature on mixed oligopoly (duopoly), see
Matsushima and Matsumura (2003a), Matsushima and Matsumura (2003b),
Ba ´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo ´n (2003), Fjell and Heywood (2004), Matsumura and
Kanda (2005), and Lu and Poddar (2005), etc.
Vol. 88 (2006), No. 1, pp. 49–68
DOI 10.1007/s00712-006-0186-6 Journal of Economics
Printed in Austriaﬁrms and foreign private ﬁrms, characterized the equilibrium and
explored welfare implications of nationalization, privatization and the
creation of a public ﬁrm. Fjell and Pal (1996) investigated the effect of the
introduction of foreign private ﬁrms on the equilibrium price and allo-
cation of production (relative to the case when all private ﬁrms are
domestically owned); Fjell and Heywood (2002) considered a mixed
oligopoly in which a public Stackelberg leader competes with both
domestic and foreign private ﬁrms.
In the literature on mixed oligopoly, most of the articles assume ﬁrms
make quantity choices simultaneously or sequentially and the order of
moves is treated as exogenously given. There also have been some papers
discussing endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly since an alternate
order of moves often produces signiﬁcantly different results and thus leads
to different welfare level. For example, Pal (1998) analyzed endogenous
order of moves in quantity choice in a mixed oligopoly consisting of a
single public ﬁrm and n domestic private ﬁrms.
2 Matsumura (2003)
considered endogenous roles of ﬁrms in a mixed duopoly market where a
state-owned public ﬁrm and a foreign private ﬁrm compete.
However, there is no paper discussing endogenous timing in a mixed
oligopolywithbothdomesticandforeignprivateﬁrms.Therearenoforeign
private ﬁrms in Pal (1998) and no domestic private ﬁrms in Matsumura
(2003). In reality, public ﬁrms, domestic private ﬁrms and foreign private




endogenous timing in such a mixed oligopoly is very important and it is
surprising that there is no paper discussing such a question. The purpose of
this paperisto ﬁllin this gapandto addresstheissueof endogenoustiming
in a mixed oligopoly consisting of a public ﬁrm, domestic and foreign
private ﬁrms, in particular, to investigate the impact of the introduction of
foreign private ﬁrms on the endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly.
HamiltonandSlutsky(1990)isaseminalworkintheendogenoustiming
literature.Inthispaper,theauthorsconsideredtwodifferentextendedgames
in the context of a quantity setting duopoly: one is the extended game with
observable delay and the other is the extended game with action commit-
2 Jacques (2004) slightly corrects proposition 4.1 of Pal (1998).




in which period they will choose their quantities and are committed to this
choicebefore they actually choose their quantitiesandthe mixed oligopoly
consists of one public ﬁrm, nð  1Þ domestic private ﬁrms and mð  1Þ
foreign privateﬁrms.Atthis stage,wefocus onthe lineardemandcase. We
ﬁnd that in any equilibrium, the public ﬁrm chooses to be a follower of all
domestic private ﬁrms, the public ﬁrm chooses not to be a leader of all
foreignprivateﬁrms,whichisincontrasttoMatsumura(2003),andthatthe
numberofsubgameperfectNashequilibria(SPNE)dependsonthenumber
of the domestic private ﬁrms and that of the foreign private ﬁrms.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Sect. 2, we describe the
model. Section 3 presents the results when there are only three possible
periods for quantity choice. The SPNEs are presented in Sect. 4 when
there are more than three possible periods to be chosen. Section 5 con-
cludes the paper.
2 The Model
Consider a mixed oligopoly model with one public ﬁrm, nð  1Þ domestic
private ﬁrms and mð  1Þ foreign private ﬁrms, all producing a single
homogenous product. Let q0;qd
i and q
f
j be the quantities of the public
ﬁrm, of domestic private ﬁrm i and of foreign private ﬁrm j, respectively.







j denote the aggregate quantity. The
market price is determined by the inverse demand function p ¼ a   Q.
Assume that a is sufﬁciently large. All domestic and foreign private ﬁrms
have constant and identical marginal costs of production, which are
normalized to 0.
4
The public ﬁrm also has constant marginal cost of production. To make
the results in this paper directly comparable to those of Pal (1998), the
public ﬁrm is assumed to be less efﬁcient than the private ﬁrms.
5 Let
4 We do not consider the efﬁciency differential between the domestic private
ﬁrms and the foreign private ﬁrms for the sake of simpliﬁcation. See the con-
cluding section for discussion.
5 This assumption also allows us to avoid a trivial solution. If the public ﬁrm is
more efﬁcient than the private ﬁrms or equally efﬁcient, it would produce a
quantity such that the market price equals its marginal cost, resulting in a public
monopoly.
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cation, ﬁxed costs are assumed to be zero for all ﬁrms.
We consider the observable delay game of Hamilton and Slutsky
(1990) in the context of a quantity setting mixed oligopoly where ﬁrms
ﬁrst announce at which time they will choose their quantities and are
committed to this choice before they actually choose their quantities.
There are T   3 possible periods for quantity choice and each ﬁrm
may choose its quantity in only one of those T periods. We consider a
two stage game. In stage one, the ﬁrms simultaneously announce in
which period they will choose their quantities and are committed to
this choice. In stage two, after the announcement, ﬁrms then choose
their quantities knowing when the other ﬁrms will make their quantity
choices.
The public ﬁrm’s objective is to maximize domestic social surplus
deﬁned as the sum of consumer surplus and proﬁts of domestic ﬁrms
(including itself and all domestic private ﬁrms), whereas each private
ﬁrm’s objective is to maximize its own proﬁt. Thus, the objective
functions of the public ﬁrm, of domestic private ﬁrm i and of foreign





























































































52 Y. LuOur objective is to solve the SPNEs of this extended quantity setting
mixed oligopoly game. We restrict our attention to symmetric equilibria in
which all ﬁrms of the same type choose to produce in the same period.
6
3 Results for Three Periods (T = 3)
We derive the results for three periods (T ¼ 3) in this section. The results
for more than three periods are presented in Sect. 4.
In the following analysis, we let q 
0;Q  and p  respectively denote the
publicﬁrm’squantity,thetotalquantityandthepriceinequilibriumforany
given timing, q 
dðq 
f) denote a domestic (foreign) private ﬁrm’s quantity for
any given timing in which all domestic (foreign) private ﬁrms produce in
the same period. When we consider whether a domestic or foreign private
ﬁrm has incentive to deviate from any given timing, we always choose
domestic private ﬁrm 1 or foreign private ﬁrm 1 to be the defector. If
domestic (foreign) private ﬁrm 1 deviates, we let qd 
1 ðq
f  
1 Þ denote the
defector’s quantity, qd 
i ði ¼ 2;3;...;nÞðq
f  
j ðj ¼ 2;3;...;mÞÞ denote the
quantity of those domestic (foreign) private ﬁrms who do not defect.
First, we prove that the public ﬁrm will not produce simultaneously
with all domestic private ﬁrms. This is the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1: The public ﬁrm and all domestic private ﬁrms producing
simultaneously in the same period cannot be sustained as a SPNE out-
come.
7
Thislemmais thesame asProposition 3.1in Pal(1998) exceptthatthere
is no foreign private ﬁrm in Pal’s model. It implies that this result is robust
no matter whether foreign private ﬁrms are present in the market or not.
After proving that the public ﬁrm and domestic private ﬁrms will not
produce simultaneously in any equilibrium, we will show that the public
ﬁrm will not act as a leader of all domestic private ﬁrms.
Lemma 3.2: The public ﬁrm acting as a leader of all domestic private
ﬁrms cannot be sustained as a SPNE outcome.
6 Though we restrict our attention to symmetric equilibria, we are sure that
there is no asymmetric equilibrium because no domestic (foreign) private ﬁrm
wants to be a follower of the other domestic (foreign) private ﬁrms if there are at
least two domestic (foreign) private ﬁrms.
7 All proofs are in the Appendix.
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domesticprivateﬁrmsinanySPNE;itwillnotactasaleaderofthemeither
byLemma3.2.Fromthesetwo lemmas,thefollowingpropositionfollows.
Proposition 3.1: In any SPNE, the public ﬁrm acts as a follower of all
domestic private ﬁrms.
Intuitively, a domestic private ﬁrm has an incentive to produce as a
leader of the public ﬁrm because a domestic private ﬁrm can produce a
large amount of output so that the public ﬁrm does not produce at all.
Since the domestic private ﬁrms produce more efﬁciently than the public
ﬁrm, the public ﬁrm wants to make the domestic private ﬁrms produce
more by acting as a follower.
After considering the order of moves between the public ﬁrm and all
domestic private ﬁrms, we will consider the order of moves between the
public ﬁrm and all foreign private ﬁrms. The result is that the public ﬁrm
will not be a leader of all foreign private ﬁrms. Before we give this major
result, we need to prove the following claim.
Claim: The public ﬁrm chooses to produce in period 2 only when the
number of the foreign private ﬁrms is at least two (m   2) and all
domestic and foreign private ﬁrms choose to produce in period 1.
We have proved that the public ﬁrm acts as a follower of all domestic
private ﬁrms (Proposition 3.1). Given this result, the public ﬁrm produces
either in period 2 or 3. The above Claim states that the public ﬁrm
chooses to produce in period 2 only when m   2 and all domestic and
foreign private ﬁrms choose to produce in period 1. In this case the public
ﬁrm is a follower of all foreign private ﬁrms. And clearly the public ﬁrm
is not a leader of all foreign private ﬁrms when it chooses to produce in
period 3. So the second major result of this paper follows:
Proposition 3.2: The public ﬁrm acting as a leader of all foreign private
ﬁrms cannot be sustained as a SPNE outcome. That is, in any SPNE, the
public ﬁrm produces with all foreign private ﬁrms simultaneously or as a
follower of them.
The result that the public ﬁrm chooses to produce with all foreign
private ﬁrms simultaneously or as a follower of them in any SPNE is
sharply different from the result in Matsumura (2003) that the public ﬁrm
54 Y. Lubecomes the leader in the endogenous role game. So we can see that the
presence of the domestic private ﬁrms has a great impact on the role of the
public ﬁrm. The presence of the domestic private ﬁrms makes the public
ﬁrm choose not to produce in period 1, which in turn makes the foreign
private ﬁrms choose not to be followers of the public ﬁrm.
Finally, we present the SPNEs, the number of which depends on the
number of the domestic private ﬁrms and that of the foreign private ﬁrms.
Proposition 3.3: The number of SPNEs depends on the number of the
domestic private ﬁrms and that of the foreign private ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally,
(1) There are 6 SPNEs when n ¼ 1 and m ¼ 1, that is, when there are
only one domestic private ﬁrm and one foreign private ﬁrm in the
market. In equilibrium, the public ﬁrm chooses to produce in period
3, the domestic private ﬁrm chooses to produce in period 1 or 2, and
the foreign private ﬁrm chooses to produce in period 1, 2 or 3.
(2) There are 3 SPNEs when n ¼ 1 and m   2, that is, when there are
only one domestic private ﬁrm and at least two foreign private ﬁrms
in the market. In any equilibrium, all foreign private ﬁrms produce
in period 1. The domestic private ﬁrm and the public ﬁrm produce
in period 1 and 2, or period 1 and 3, or period 2 and 3, respectively.
(3) There are 3 SPNEs when n   2 and m ¼ 1, that is, when there are at
least two domestic private ﬁrms and only one foreign private ﬁrm in
the market. All domestic private ﬁrms produce in period 1, the public
ﬁrm produces in period 3, and the foreign private ﬁrm produces in
period 1, 2 or 3.
(4) There are 2 SPNEs when n   2 and m   2, that is, when there are at
least two domestic private ﬁrms and at least two foreign private ﬁrms
in the market. All domestic and foreign private ﬁrms produce in
period 1, and the public ﬁrm produces in period 2 or 3.
4 Main Results for More than Three Periods (T > 3)
Proposition 4.1: If T > 3, there are the following SPNEs:
(1) When n ¼ 1 and m ¼ 1, the public ﬁrm produces in the last period,
the domestic private ﬁrm produces in any period except the last
period, and the foreign private ﬁrm produces in any period;
Endogenous Timing, Mixed Oligopoly, Foreign Competitors 55(2) When n ¼ 1 and m   2, all foreign private ﬁrms produce in period 1,
the domestic private ﬁrm produces in any period except the last
period, and the public ﬁrm produces in any subsequent period after the
period in which the domestic private ﬁrm produces;
(3) When n   2 and m ¼ 1, all domestic private ﬁrms produce in period
1 and the public ﬁrm produces in the last period, and the foreign
private ﬁrm produces in any period;
(4) When n   2 and m   2, all domestic and foreign private ﬁrms pro-
duce in period 1, and the public ﬁrm produces in any subsequent
period.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we investigate endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly with
one public ﬁrm, nð  1Þ domestic private ﬁrms and mð  1Þ foreign pri-
vate ﬁrms by considering the observable delay game of Hamilton and
Slutsky (1990) in the context of a quantity setting mixed oligopoly. We
focus on the linear demand case. We ﬁnd that the public ﬁrm chooses to
be a follower of all domestic private ﬁrms, the public ﬁrm chooses not to
be a leader of all foreign private ﬁrms, which is in contrast to Matsumura
(2003), and that the number of subgame perfect Nash equilibria depends
on the number of the domestic private ﬁrms and that of the foreign private
ﬁrms.
The results in this paper question the exogenous timing in the research
of a mixed oligopoly with both domestic and foreign private ﬁrms. If the
ﬁrms could choose the timing of their quantity choices, the timing should
be endogenous. The contribution of this paper is to extend Pal (1998) by
introducing foreign private ﬁrms into a mixed oligopoly. Also a mixed
oligopoly consisting of public ﬁrm, domestic and foreign private ﬁrms is
more realistic.
A limitation of the paper is that we consider the linear demand case
only. As we can see, there exist many equilibria in this case. Whether all
these equilibria survive under nonlinear demand function needs to be
explored. This is a direction for future research. A good reference is
Matsumura (2003) in which the author used a general demand function
with the property of p00   0 and showed that the public ﬁrm acts as a
leader in a mixed duopoly with a foreign competitor.
56 Y. LuOne extension of this paper could consider the efﬁciency differential
between the domestic private ﬁrms and foreign private ﬁrms. Gener-
ally, foreign ones are more efﬁcient. So we could assume foreign
private ﬁrms’ marginal costs are zero, while domestic ones’ marginal
costs are positive but less than public ﬁrms’. This is also left for future
research.
Appendix
If all ﬁrms produce simultaneously in period tð¼ 1;2;3Þ, then every
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j ¼0; for j¼1;2;:::;m: ðA:3Þ
Proof of Lemma 1
We can show that either the public ﬁrm or a domestic private ﬁrm has
incentive to deviate if the public ﬁrm and all domestic private ﬁrms
produce simultaneously in the same period, that is, deviate from the
following three cases.
8
8 We provide a table (Table 1) to list one example of proﬁtable defection for
every case (and subcase) which cannot be sustained as SPNE.
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58 Y. LuTable 1. (continued)














19 d, f p f1 deviates to produce
in period 3 when m ¼ 1
Ruled out by
Lemma 2
when m ¼ 1;
SPNE when
m   2
(Case 3.1)










22 d, f p SPNE
2 3 dfpf 1 deviates to produce
in period 1 when m   2
SPNE when
m ¼ 1
24 d f, p f1 deviates to produce in
period 1 (or 2) when m   2
SPNE when
m ¼ 1
2 5 fdpd 1 deviates to produce in
period 1 when n   2
SPNE when
n ¼ 1
26 f, d p d1 deviates to produce
in period 1 when
n   2,f 1 deviates
to produce in period 1
when m   2
SPNE when
n ¼ m ¼ 1
27 d f, p d1 deviates to produce in
period 1
when n   2,f 1 deviates
to produce
in period 1 (or 2) when
m   2
SPNE when
n ¼ m ¼ 1
Note: In columns 2, 3, 4 and 5, p, d, f denote the public ﬁrm, domestic private
ﬁrms and foreign private ﬁrms. In column 5, d1 and f1 denote domestic private
ﬁrm 1 and foreign private ﬁrm 1, respectively.
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simultaneously as leaders and all foreign private ﬁrms produce simulta-
neously as followers.
If this is the case, then from (A.3), we can obtain foreign private ﬁrm
j’s reaction function, q
f










j ¼ð a   q0  
Pn
i¼1 qd
i Þ=ðm þ 1Þ. It follows that Q ¼ð ma þ q0þ
Pn
i¼1 qd
i Þ=ðm þ 1Þ and p ¼ð a   q0  
Pn
i¼1 qd
i Þ=ðm þ 1Þ. Thus, the































and a domestic private ﬁrm i’s proﬁt function becomes
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i Þ=ðm þ 1Þ









k   2qd
i ¼ 0; for i ¼ 1;2;:::;n: ðA.5Þ
Solving these equations yields q 
0 ¼ a  ð n þ 1Þðm þ 1Þ
2c=ð2m þ 1Þ;
q 
d ¼ð m þ 1Þ
2c=ð2m þ 1Þ;q 
f ¼ð m þ 1Þc=ð2m þ 1Þ;Q  ¼ a  ð m þ 1Þ
c=ð2m þ 1Þ and p  ¼ð m þ 1Þc=ð2m þ 1Þ:
Now consider the case in which the public ﬁrm deviates to produce
simultaneously with all foreign private ﬁrms instead. Then from (A.1) and
(A.3), we can obtain q 
f ¼ c=ðm þ 1Þ and the public ﬁrm’s reaction
function, q0 ¼ a  
Pn
i¼1 qd
i   c. It follows that p ¼c=ðm þ 1Þ and
Q  ¼ a   c=ðm þ 1Þ. As leaders of the public ﬁrm, all domestic private
ﬁrms produce as more as possible such that q 
0 ¼ 0and the total equi-
librium output of the domestic private ﬁrms is a   c.
Comparing this deviation case with Case 1.1, we ﬁnd that the total
output is larger, the equilibrium price is lower, the output of a foreign
private ﬁrm is smaller, and more output is now being produced by more
60 Y. Luefﬁcient domestic private ﬁrms. So the public ﬁrm has incentive to
deviate from Case 1.1.
Case 1.2: All foreign private ﬁrms produce simultaneously as leaders
and the public ﬁrm and all domestic private ﬁrms produce simultaneously
as followers.
If this is the case, then from (A.1) and (A.2), we can obtain domestic
private ﬁrm i’s reaction function, qd











It follows that qd













j . Thus, foreign private ﬁrm j’s proﬁt function becomes
p
f






j . We can easily get a foreign private ﬁrm’s proﬁt-
maximization output, q 
f ¼ c=ðm þ 1Þ. It follows that q 
0 ¼ a   c   nc=
ðm þ 1Þ; q 
d ¼ c=ðm þ 1Þ; Q  ¼ a   c=ðm þ 1Þ and p  ¼ c=ðm þ 1Þ.
Now consider the case in which domestic private ﬁrm 1 deviates to
produce simultaneously with all foreign private ﬁrms as a leader. Then we
can obtain domestic private ﬁrm i’s reaction function,
qd








j Þ=2ði ¼ 2;3;:::;nÞ and the
public ﬁrm’s reaction function, q0 ¼ a   c  
Pn
i¼1 qd
i . It follows that
qd




j ði ¼ 2;3;...nÞ; q0 ¼ a   qd









j . Thus, foreign private ﬁrm j’s and domestic private
ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt function become p
f













1, respectively. We can easily get a foreign private
ﬁrm’s and domestic private ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt-maximization output,
q 
f ¼ c=ðm þ 1Þ and qd 
1 ¼ a  ð n þ mÞc=ðm þ 1Þ. It follows that
p  ¼ c=ðm þ 1Þ.Clearly,domesticprivateﬁrm1nowproducesmorewhile
thepricedoesnotchangeandthusithasincentivetodeviatefromCase1.2.
Case 1.3: All the ﬁrms produce simultaneously.
If this is the case, then solving (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3), we get the
equilibrium outcome: q 
0 ¼ a   c   nc=ðm þ 1Þ;q 
d ¼ q 
f ¼ c=ðm þ 1Þ.I t
follows that Q  ¼ a   c=ðm þ 1Þ and p  ¼ c=ðm þ 1Þ.
There are two subcases to consider.
Subcase 1.3.1: All ﬁrms produce simultaneously in period tð¼ 1o r2 Þ.
Consider the public ﬁrm deviates to be a follower, then the public
ﬁrm’s reaction function is q0 ¼ a  
Pn
i¼1 qd
i   c and thus




j . In period tð¼ 1o r2 Þ, all domestic ﬁrms want to
produce as more as possible since price is positive and is independent of
their output provided that the total output is not too large. Thus, Pn
i¼1 qd
i ¼ a   c such that q0 ¼ 0. All foreign private ﬁrms’ proﬁt
function becomes p
f






j and their equilibrium output is
q 
f ¼ c=ðm þ 1Þ. Hence, the equilibrium outcome is that q 
0 ¼ 0, the total
equilibrium output of the domestic private ﬁrms is
a   c;q 
f ¼ c=ðm þ 1Þ;Q  ¼ a   c=ðm þ 1Þ and p  ¼ c=ðm þ 1Þ.Com-
paring this deviation case with subcase 1.3.1, we ﬁnd that the total output,
the equilibrium price and the output of a foreign private ﬁrm do not
change, but more output is now being produced by more efﬁcient
domestic private ﬁrms. So the public ﬁrm has incentive to deviate from
subcase 1.3.1.
Subcase 1.3.2: All ﬁrms produce simultaneously in period 3.
Consider domestic private ﬁrm 1 deviates to be a leader in period
tð¼ 1o r2 Þ , then we can ﬁnd that in period 3 q 
f ¼ qd 
i ¼ c=ðm þ 1Þ, for
i ¼ 2;:::;n and q0 ¼ a  ð n þ mÞc=ðm þ 1Þ qd
1. It follows that
p ¼c=ðm þ 1Þ. In period tð¼ 1o r2 Þ, domestic private ﬁrm 1 wants to
produce as more as possible such that q0 ¼ 0. Thus,
qd 
1 ¼ a  ð n þ mÞc=ðm þ 1Þ. Comparing this deviation case with sub-
case 1.3.2, we ﬁnd that the equilibrium price does not change and
domestic private ﬁrm 1 now produces more, so it has incentive to deviate
from subcase 1.3.2. (
Proof of Lemma 2
We can show that either the public ﬁrm, or a domestic private ﬁrm, or a
foreign private ﬁrm has incentive to deviate from the cases in which the
public ﬁrm acts as a leader of all domestic private ﬁrms. There are ﬁve
cases to consider.
Case 2.1: The public ﬁrm produces as a leader, and all domestic and
foreign private ﬁrms produce simultaneously as followers.
Case 2.2: Thepublic ﬁrmandall foreign private ﬁrmsproduce as aleader,
and all domestic private ﬁrms produce simultaneously as followers.
Case 2.3: The public ﬁrm, all domestic private ﬁrms and the foreign
private ﬁrms produce in period 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
62 Y. LuCase 2.4: The public ﬁrm, all foreign private ﬁrms and the domestic
private ﬁrms produce in period 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
Case 2.5: All foreign private ﬁrms, the public ﬁrm and the domestic
private ﬁrms and produce in period 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
Now we prove Case 2.1 cannot be sustained as SPNE. There are three
subcases to consider.
In Case 2.1, the equilibrium outcome is q 
0 ¼ a  ð n þ m þ 1Þ
2c=
ð2m þ 1Þ;q 
d ¼ q 
f ¼ð n þ m þ 1Þc=ð2m þ 1Þ;Q  ¼ a  ð n þ m þ 1Þc=
ð2m þ 1Þ and p  ¼ð n þ m þ 1Þc=ð2m þ 1Þ.
Subcase 2.1.1: The public ﬁrm acts as a leader in period 1 and all
domestic and foreign private ﬁrms produce simultaneously as followers in
period 2.
If the public ﬁrm produces in period 3 instead, then the equilibrium
outcome is q 
0 ¼ 0, the total equilibrium output of the domestic private
ﬁrms is a   c;q 
f ¼ c=ðm þ 1Þ;Q  ¼ a   c=ðm þ 1Þ and
p  ¼ c=ðm þ 1Þ. Comparing this deviation case with subcase 2.1.1, we
ﬁnd that the total output is larger, the equilibrium price is lower, the
output of a foreign private ﬁrm is smaller, and more output is now being
produced by more efﬁcient domestic private ﬁrms. So the public ﬁrm has
incentive to deviate from Case 2.1.1.
Subcase 2.1.2: The public ﬁrm acts as a leader in period 1, and all
domestic and foreign private ﬁrms produce simultaneously as followers in
period 3.
If domestic private ﬁrm 1 produces in period 2 instead, then the
equilibrium outcome is q 
0 ¼ a   4ðn þ mÞ
2c=ð2m þ 1Þ;qd 
1 ¼ 2ðn þ mÞ
2
c=ð2m þ 1Þ;qd 
i ¼ q 
f ¼ 2ðn þ mÞc=ð2m þ 1Þði ¼ 2;3;...;nÞ; Q  ¼
a   2ðn þ mÞc=ð2m þ 1Þ and p  ¼ 2ðn þ mÞc=ð2m þ 1Þ. Comparing this
deviation case with subcase 2.1.2, we ﬁnd that the equilibrium price is
higher and domestic private ﬁrm 1 now produces more, so it has incentive
to deviate from subcase 2.1.2.
Subcase 2.1.3: The public ﬁrm acts as a leader in period 2 and all
domestic and foreign private ﬁrms produce simultaneously as followers in
period 3.
If domestic private ﬁrm 1 produces in period 1 instead, then the
equilibrium outcome is q 
0 ¼ 0;qd 
1 ¼ a  ð n þ mÞ
2c=ð2m þ 1Þ;qd 
i ¼
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f ¼ð n þ mÞc=ð2m þ 1Þði ¼ 2;3;...;nÞ;Q  ¼ a  ð n þ mÞc=ð2m þ 1Þ
andp  ¼ð n þ mÞc=ð2m þ 1Þ.Comparing this deviationcase with subcase
2.1.3, we ﬁnd that domestic private ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt increases, so it has
incentive to deviate from subcase 2.1.3.
Similarly, we can prove all the other cases mentioned above cannot be
sustained as SPNE by showing that either the public ﬁrm, or a domestic
private ﬁrm, or a foreign private ﬁrm has incentive to deviate. We list one
example of proﬁtable defection in each case in Table 1. Note that Case
2.2 includes three subcases:
Subcase 2.2.1: The public ﬁrm and all foreign private ﬁrms act as leaders
in period 1, and domestic private ﬁrms produce simultaneously as fol-
lowers in period 2.
Subcase 2.2.2: The public ﬁrm and all foreign private ﬁrms act as leaders
in period 1, and domestic private ﬁrms produce simultaneously as fol-
lowers in period 3.
Subcase 2.2.3: The public ﬁrm and all foreign private ﬁrms act as leaders
in period 2, and domestic private ﬁrms produce simultaneously as fol-
lowers in period 3. (
Proof of Claim
We have proved that the public ﬁrm acts as a follower of all domestic
private ﬁrms (Proposition 3.1). Given this result, if the public ﬁrm pro-
duces in period 2, all domestic private ﬁrms must produce in period 1, and
thus there are only the following three cases to consider.
Case 3.1: All foreign private ﬁrms produce in period 1.
Inthiscase, theequilibriumoutcomeisthat q 
0 ¼ 0,thetotalequilibrium
output of the domestic private ﬁrms is a   c;q 
f ¼ c=ðm þ 1Þ;
Q  ¼ a   c=ðm þ 1Þ and p  ¼ c=ðm þ 1Þ. Clearly, the public ﬁrm has no
incentivetodeviatetoproduceinperiod3andproofofLemma3.1(subcase
1.3.1)showsitwillnotdeviatetoproduceinperiod1.Wecanalsoshowthat
a domestic private ﬁrm has no incentive to deviate; this can be easily
understoodsinceitisalreadyaleaderofthepublicﬁrminCase3.1.Nextwe
consider whether a foreign private ﬁrm, say foreign private ﬁrm 1, has
incentive to deviate.
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that p  ¼ q
f 
1 ¼ 2c=3m and thus p
f
1 ¼ 4c2=ð9m2Þ. If it does not deviate,
p
f
1 ¼ c2=ðm þ 1Þ
2. Clearly, it has incentive to deviate when m ¼ 1and
has no incentive when m   2.
If foreign private ﬁrm 1 deviates to produce in period 2, we can show
that p  ¼ q
f 
1 ¼ c=2m and thus p
f
1 ¼ c2=4m2. If it does not deviate,
p
f
1 ¼ c2=ðm þ 1Þ
2. Clearly, it has no incentive to deviate.
So Case 3.1 can be sustained as SPNE when m   2 and cannot when
m ¼ 1.
Case 3.2: All foreign private ﬁrms produce in period 2.
In this case, p  ¼ q 
f ¼ c=ðm þ 1Þ and thus p
f
1 ¼ c2=ðm þ 1Þ
2. If for-
eign private ﬁrm 1 deviates to produce in period 3, then we can show that
in equilibrium p  ¼ q
f  
1 ¼ 2c=ð2m þ 1Þ and thus p
f
1 ¼ 4c2=ð2m þ 1Þ
2,
which is greater than c2=ðm þ 1Þ
2. So it has incentive to deviate.
Case 3.3: All foreign private ﬁrms produce in period 3.
In this case, the equilibrium outcome is thatq 
0 ¼ 0, the total equilibrium
output of the domestic private ﬁrms is a   m þ 1 ðÞ
2c= 2m þ 1 ðÞ ;
q 
f ¼ð m þ 1Þc=ð2m þ 1Þ;Q  ¼ a  ð m þ 1Þc=ð2m þ 1Þ andp ¼ðmþ1Þ
c=ð2m þ 1Þ. If the public ﬁrm deviates to produce in period 3, then q 
0 ¼ 0,
the total equilibrium output of the domestic private ﬁrms is
a   c;q 
f ¼ c=ðm þ 1Þ;Q  ¼ a   c=ðm þ 1Þ and p  ¼ c=ðm þ 1Þ. Com-
paringthisdeviationcasewithCase3.3,weﬁndthatthetotaloutputislarger,
theequilibriumpriceislower,theoutputofaforeignprivateﬁrmissmaller,
and more output is now being produced by more efﬁcient domestic private
ﬁrms. So the public ﬁrm has incentive to deviate from Case 3.3. h
Proof of Proposition 3.3
We prove this proposition by checking that no ﬁrm has incentive to
deviate in each SPNE of each case.
(1) When n ¼ 1 and m ¼ 1: Firstly, note that the public ﬁrm chooses to
produce in period 3 when m ¼ 1 (which follows from Claim).
Secondly, the domestic private ﬁrm has no incentive to deviate
since it is a leader of the public ﬁrm and cannot increase its output
because there is only one domestic private ﬁrm. Thirdly, the ﬁrst
order condition of the public ﬁrm’s domestic social welfare maxi-
mization problem is @SS=@q0 ¼ a  ð q0 þ qd
1Þ c ¼ 0, that is,




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































66 Y. Lup ¼ c   q
f
1 . If the foreign private ﬁrm produces in period 1 or 2,




the foreign private ﬁrm produces in period 3, the ﬁrst-order con-





 ðq0 þ qd
1Þ 2q
f
1 ¼ 0 (and the ﬁrst-order condition of the
public ﬁrm’s welfare maximizing problem is @SS=@q0 ¼ a
 ðq0 þ qd
1Þ c ¼ 0) and its proﬁt-maximizing output is the same.
Hence, the foreign private ﬁrm does not care about in which period
to produce. To make it clearer, the normal form of observable delay
two-stage game when n ¼ m ¼ 1 is provided in Table 2.
(2) When n ¼ 1 and m   2: Firstly, the public ﬁrm has no incentive to
deviate. Secondly, the domestic private ﬁrm has no incentive to
deviate for the same reason as in the ﬁrst case. Thirdly, no foreign
private ﬁrm has incentive to deviate because the domestic private
ﬁrm’s output will increase while its output will decrease if it deviates.
(3) When n   2 and m ¼ 1: Firstly, the public ﬁrm has no incentive to
deviate. Secondly, all domestic private ﬁrms have no incentive to
deviate since they want to produce more in period 1 and cannot
increase its output by deviating. Thirdly, the only foreign private ﬁrm
has no incentive to deviate for the same reason as in the ﬁrst case.
(4) When n   2 and m   2: Firstly, the public ﬁrm has no incentive to
deviate. Secondly, all domestic and foreign private ﬁrms have no
incentive to deviate since they want to produce more in period 1 and
cannot increase its output by deviating. (
Proof of Proposition 4.1
We need to note that a foreign private ﬁrm has incentive to deviate to be a
follower of the public ﬁrm if m ¼ 1. So the public ﬁrm must produce in the
last period when m ¼ 1. We also need to note that a domestic (foreign)
private ﬁrm has incentive to produce in period 1 if there are at least two
domestic (foreign) private ﬁrms. Therefore, all domestic (foreign) private
ﬁrms must produce in period 1 if n   2 ðm   2Þ: h
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